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Abstract 
Modeling of Jet Engine Abnormal Conditions and Detection Using 
the Artificial Immune System Paradigm 
Jaclyn Marie Porter 
Previous research at WVU has yielded promising results in the detection of aircraft sub-
systems malfunctions using the artificial immune system (AIS) paradigm. However, one aircraft 
component that requires improvement is the aircraft propulsion system. In this research effort, 
MAPSS, a non-real time low-bypass turbofan engine model distributed by NASA, has been 
linearized and interfaced with the WVU F-15 model and the WVU 6 degrees-of-freedom flight 
simulator to provide a more complex engine model and create more options for engine failure 
modeling and engine failure detection. A variety of engine actuator and sensor failures were 
modeled and implemented into the simulation environment. A detection scheme based on the 
AIS approach was developed for specific classes of failures including throttle, burner fuel flow 
valve, variable nozzle area actuator, variable mixer area actuator, low-pressure spool speed 
sensor, low-pressure turbine exit static pressure sensor, and mixer pressure ratio sensor. 
A 5-dimensional feature hyper-space is determined to build the “self” within the AIS 
paradigm for abnormal condition detection purposes. The WVU AIS interactive design 
environment based on evolutionary algorithms was used for data processing, detector 
generation, and limited optimization. Flight simulation data for system development and 
testing was acquired through experiments in the WVU 6 degrees-of-freedom flight simulator 
over extended areas of the flight envelope. The AIS-based detection scheme was tested using 
both nominal and engine failure conditions and its performance evaluated in terms of detection 
rates and false alarms. As compared to the previous failure detection results, significant 
improvement has been demonstrated as well as excellent potential for detection of the newly 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Problem Definition 
Typically, aircraft jet engines are modeled in a very simple way for most flight simulation 
and control applications using a look-up table for Mach, altitude, and throttle. Recently, the 
potential of using engines to control the aircraft when standard control actuators fail has been 
given a lot of attention. Many efforts are made to integrate engine control with aerodynamic 
control for improved performance and fault tolerance. In general, aircraft upset conditions 
(prevention, detection, and accommodation) are currently of high interest due to the increasing 
concern and awareness regarding aircraft safety. There is a need for “integrated and 
comprehensive” systems that solve this problem. This means that the system must be able to 
handle autonomously (without human direct intervention, without switching operational 
modes) abnormal conditions of “all” aircraft sub-systems, of “all” types, and over all regions of 
the flight envelope. An “intelligent” control system with high fault tolerance capabilities is 
needed.  
Efforts at West Virginia University (WVU) in Fault tolerant control laws have led to the 
development of the WVU F-15 aircraft model within the Matlab®/Simulink® environment. The 
WVU aircraft simulation environment uses a graphical user interface (GUI) to allow the user to 
choose the aircraft flight conditions, pilot inputs, failure scenarios, etc. for the flight. The F-15 
aircraft model includes modeling of nominal flight conditions, control surface failure, sensor 
failure, engine failure (which uses only a look-up table), and structural damage. This thesis 
focuses on the need for more accurate engine models to be included into the existing 
simulation environment and integrated into the general failure detection, identification, 
evaluation, and accommodation (FDIEA) process.  
Artificial Immune System (AIS) techniques are being used in an attempt to solve the 
FDIEA problem. The WVU AIS design environment was developed to create, optimize, and test 
immunity based failure detectors. The AIS design environment and the WVU Simulation 
Environment of the F-15 aircraft model are used together to test this possible solution to the 
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FDIEA problem. Previous research has yielded promising results in the failure detection and 
identification phases for many of the modeled failures.  
Since the current engine model consists of a thrust look-up table, no internal engine 
parameters are available to use as detectors. The existing failure detection schemes must use 
aircraft dynamics to try to identify engine failure. In this paper, development of a more complex 
engine model will create more options for engine failure modeling and engine failure detection. 
The new linear engine model is based on a low-bypass turbofan engine, which contains many 
actuators and sensors. The actuators and sensors which have the most effect on the dynamics 
of the engine model will be modeled as failures. It is predicted that this will not only enhance 
the accuracy of the engine model but also the failure detection. After the engine model 
development, the new available parameters are used to create immunity based failure 
detectors. This thesis will show improvement of the detection rates and false alarms compared 
to the previous failure detection results and good potential for detection of the newly 
developed engine failures. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The research effort presented in this thesis was aimed at reaching the following 
research objectives. 
• Develop and test a more accurate linear engine model to integrate with the WVU 
F15 Matlab/Simulink® model replacing the previous engine model based only on 
thrust look-up tables.  
• Develop and test various engine specific actuator and sensor failures. 
• Investigate/design detection schemes based on the Artificial Immune System. The 
latest is based on a detailed analysis of interactions between failed components and 
the rest of the engine, and the dynamic response of the aircraft. In other words, 
analysis of how much individual engine parts affect everything else. This is useful to 
eventually define the set of identifiers to be used in the AIS-based detection.  
• Compare the results of the AIS detection schemes with previous results that were 
based only on the aircraft response. 
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1.3 Thesis Overview 
The following chapter structure describes the organization of this thesis. 
• Chapter 2 contains the literature review, which presents descriptions of engine and 
engine failure model development and various research on the subjects of AIS and 
FDIE. 
• Chapter 3 introduces/discusses the WVU Simulation Environment which includes the 
Simulink® model, the WVU 6-DOF Flight Simulator, and the Graphical User Interface.  
• Chapter 4 describes the engine model development, including the creation of the 
linear model and the description of the controller, sensor, and actuator dynamics 
subsystems. This chapter also contains an example and explanation of a healthy 
engine simulation.  
• Chapter 5 consists of the engine failure modeling and provides an example of an 
unhealthy engine simulation. 
• Chapter 6 presents the design of the failure detection scheme including descriptions 
of AIS, the self, data processing, identifiers, and detectors used for the engine 
model.  
• Chapter 7 consists of the experimental procedures, which explains in detail, the 
flight plans and testing, the development of the self, and the detection of failures.  
• Chapter 8 displays and discusses validation of the system as well as the results of the 
AIS on the flight tests of several engine failures. New failures are examined for the 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Engine Models 
In order to create the architecture needed for a more complex engine model, 
investigation into existing engine models was done. A number of models were found which 
were being used for different purposes. The type of engine model needed for application in the 
WVU F-15 aircraft model should represent a generic military type jet engine. 
While nonlinear models may be accurate, they are typically non-real time and cannot be 
used in real-time simulation and are difficult (even impossible) to be used as such for control 
system design. Simpler and faster linear models must be developed from nonlinear differential 
and algebraic equations for use in these applications [1]. A nonlinear engine model is 
estimated, usually from test data, around an operating point to obtain a linear model. These 
linear time invariant (LTI) models are used for engine control despite their limited flight 
envelope.  
For transient engine operations, the linear model would ideally include multiple 
operating points [1]. This is done through a piecewise-linear model, which interpolates several 
linear models at different operating points in the flight envelope. While the piecewise-linear 
models provide greater accuracy for fast simulations, they are not convenient for controller 
design since they are technically still nonlinear. “Jet Engine Model for Control and Real-Time 
Simulations” [1] discussed a simple/fast quasilinear engine model based on nonlinear functions 
used for controller design. Simulation results comparing nonlinear and fast models were found 
to reasonably agree.  
Many of the turbofan engine models and simulators used in industry are based on 
numerous lookup tables and empirical data derived from real experiments [2, 3]. For the design 
of low complexity gain-scheduled control laws, linear models are necessary at relevant points in 
the flight envelope. Henrion et al. [4] have presented a methodology for the derivation of such 
linearized models of aircraft turbofan engine dynamics from standard engine simulators used in 
industry. Several versions of the Matlab linearization function linmod were used for this 
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purpose and some issues related to the performance of these algorithms were identified and 
discussed. The authors also emphasized the sensitivity of model accuracy with the selection of 
flight condition and excitation input.  
Despite the effectiveness of engine models based on look-up tables for control design, 
NASA researchers observed interest in intelligent engine component technology particularly in 
the field of aircraft health management [5]. As a result, the Modular Aero-Propulsion System 
Simulation, or MAPSS, was developed. MAPSS uses a nonlinear simulation of a generic turbofan 
engine in Simulink® along with a GUI to create a computer aided control design and simulation 
package with graphical representation of the engine systems. Validation was done using a 
FORTRAN engine simulation. MAPSS provides easy access to health, engine, and control 
parameters along with the option to create linear models based on the nonlinear steady-state 
response to certain operating conditions for Mach, altitude, and power lever angle (PLA) [5, 6]. 
2.2 Engine Failure Models 
For most applications, engine failure models consist of simple failures/malfunctions 
based on available input parameters, such as throttle failures or reduced thrust output, etc. 
Currently within the WVU F15 aircraft model are three options for engine failures [7]. The 
“stuck throttle” engine failure corresponds to a functioning engine with no response to throttle 
actuation. The “thrust runaway” failure represents a malfunction of the fuel control system 
which reaches maximum fuel flow resulting in increased thrust. Since modeling of the fuel 
control system is unavailable, this failure is modeled by increasing the throttle to maximum 
over a period of time. Finally, reducing the throttle input by a constant factor represents the 
“power/thrust reduced control efficiency”. It is apparent that these engine failures are modeled 
based on throttle input since it is the only available parameter [7].  
Clearly, once a more complex engine model is developed, more complex engine failure 
models can be used. Sarkar et al. [8] discuss some aircraft engine failures on a simulation test 
bed. The engine model used is similar to the NASA MAPSS model. Here, the engine failures are 
based on the efficiency health parameter and the flow health parameter. Each of the six main 
engine components (defined in Chapter 4) has these health parameters which affect the 
6 
 
efficiency and flow of that particular component. Once the health parameter values at healthy 
conditions are obtained, the failure is created by setting the nominal condition of each 
parameter at 1.0 below the healthy condition. Reducing the health parameter value below the 
nominal condition represents an engine component failure [8]. 
With engine models such as MAPSS [6] that contain actuator dynamics and sensor 
outputs, the same modeling techniques used in other engine actuator and sensor failures can 
be applied. Aircraft actuator failures within the WVU F-15 aircraft model include modeling of a 
stuck aerodynamic control surface where the control surface remains fixed in the current 
position/deflection or moves to a user defined position at the time of failure [7]. Also within 
this aircraft model are aircraft sensor failures which consist of an output bias. The sensor 
output transitions to this bias either instantaneous, known as a step bias, or over a period of 
time, called a drifting bias. The size of the bias (large or small) and the speed of the drift (fast or 
slow) are user defined [7]. 
2.3 Failure Detection and Accommodation 
The main purpose for building a more complex engine model is to improve the 
detection of engine failures. Many failure detection schemes are being developed in an attempt 
to improve safety and reliability of aircraft operations. Sarkar et al. [8, 9] present concepts for 
fault detection and isolation (FDI) with application on an aircraft gas turbine model. The focus 
here is detection and isolation of failures close to the time of occurrence. The FDI algorithms 
used by the authors are based on symbolic dynamic filtering (SDF), which is built upon the 
principles of symbolic dynamics, statistical pattern recognition, and information theory [9]. SDF 
was found to be effective not only with catastrophic failures but also with small magnitude 
failures. Since the engine failure model is based on health parameters, the failure can be made 
to start out small and evolve over a period time. The purpose of detection of these growing 
engine failures is to monitor the deterioration of different engine parts over the life of the 
engine.  
Another promising technique, which is in development at WVU [7], is based on the 
human immune system. This concept is called the artificial immune system (AIS). AIS-based 
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failure detection is designed to distinguish parts of the system that do not belong to the “self”. 
The basic idea is that an abnormal condition, or failure, is declared when the current system 
does not correspond to normal conditions. Moncayo et al. [7] have used this concept with the 
WVU F-15 aircraft model in an attempt to solve the fault detection, identification, and 
evaluation (FDIE) problem in a variety of aircraft sensor, actuator, propulsion (engine), and 
structural failures/damages over an extended flight envelope. The system’s effectiveness is 
measured in terms of rates of detection and false alarms. “Detection” refers to positive 
detection during the time period after the failure occurs while “false alarms” are positive 
detections when no failure is present. The authors show promising potential of the AIS in the 
field of aircraft sub-system failure detection and identification.  





Chapter 3: WVU Simulation Tools 
3.1 General Description of the WVU Simulation Environment 
An advanced simulation environment has been developed at WVU [10] to support the 
design, evaluation, and validation of aircraft fault-tolerant control laws. Matlab and Simulink 
are used to ensure maximum portability and flexibility. Model blocks from the Flight Dynamics 
and Control (FDC) toolbox [11] are included for solving the equations of motion, and modeling 
wind and atmospheric turbulence effects. The dynamic model is interfaced with the Aviator 
Visual Design Simulator (AVDS) simulation package [12] to provide visual cues when used 
directly on a desktop computer. The main components of the WVU simulation environment are 
presented in Figure 3.1. These five modules are: 
• Aircraft Model Module 
• Control System Module 
• Aircraft Sub-System Failure Models 
• Failure Detection and Identification Schemes 
• User Interface 






Figure 3.1: General Architecture of the WVU Simulation Environment 
 





















































The simulation environment can also be interfaced with the WVU 6 degrees-of-freedom 
flight simulator interacting with the simulator supporting software, X-Plane [13]. This 
configuration, illustrated in Figure 3.3 [14], is used to perform tests in the flight simulator. The 
Simulink model interfaced with the WVU 6-DOF flight simulator and X-Plane is shown in Figure 
3.4.  
The aircraft dynamic model can be flown using a joystick or a set of pre-recorded 
command time histories. User-friendly GUI menus are used to set the conditions for the 
simulation scenarios, including a variety of options related to the architecture of the control 
laws, failure type and magnitude, and input/output content. An example of the user interface 
provided by the AVDS visualization and the monitoring of relevant engine parameters using 
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Figure 3.5: Interface of the WVU Simulation Environment 
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3.2 Aircraft Model 
The Aircraft Model Module can be considered to include four major components: the 
wind and turbulence model, the aircraft dynamic equations of motion, the aerodynamic 
database, and the engine model. The development of a more accurate and flexible engine 
model was a major objective of this thesis. The initial engine model within the WVU simulation 
environment consisted of a simple 3-dimensional look-up table for thrust as a function of 
throttle, Mach, and altitude. Chapter 4 provides details regarding the development of the new 
engine model including all major internal actuators and sensors as well as the internal 
dedicated engine controller. 
The Dryden model implemented within the FDC toolbox was used to simulate 
turbulence effects and constant wind of pre-determined direction and magnitude. The FDC 
toolbox ‘Equations of Motion Solver’ was used, which implements general rigid body dynamics 
assuming constant mass and inertias. The computation of aerodynamic forces and moments is 
distributed for each control surface, wing, and engine. This specific feature is necessary for 
modeling the failures with adequate level of generality.  
The aerodynamic model was derived from a non-linear model of a high performance 
military aircraft distributed by NASA to academic institutions in 1990 within a student design 
competition [15]. The aerodynamic database is structured with a number of look-up tables, 
which are functions of one or more dynamic variables, such as Mach number and/or angle of 
attack. 
3.3 Control System Model 
Two general strategies for adaptive control laws are implemented within the WVU 
simulation environment: indirect and direct adaptive flight control laws [10]. Indirect adaptive 
flight control laws consist of optimal control design approach and frequency domain-based on-
line parameter estimation. The direct adaptive flight control laws design is based on non-linear 
dynamic inversion at a reference nominal flight condition plus artificial neural networks 
augmentation to compensate for inversion errors and abnormal flight conditions. For the 
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purpose of this research effort, the direct adaptive control laws were used. The engine has its 
own internal controller, which will be described in Chapter 4. 
As part of the general control system, the WVU simulation environment includes failure 
detection identification and accommodation (FDIA) schemes for aerodynamic actuators and 
sensors relying on monitoring relevant dynamic measurements, information processing based 
on neural estimators, and comparison against pre-determined thresholds. In this thesis, a novel 
approach is developed and analyzed for engine abnormal conditions detection based on an 
artificial immune system. The detailed design and performance evaluation of this detection 
method is presented in Chapters 6 and 8. 
3.4 Failure Models 
In this section, a brief overview of sub-system failure models previously implemented 
within the WVU simulation environment is presented. The engine failure models associated to 
the more accurate engine model developed for the purposes of this thesis are discussed in 
detail in Chapter 5. 
Two types of aerodynamic control surface failure are implemented within the WVU 
simulation environment. The first failure type corresponds to an actuator mechanism failure. 
The control surface remains fixed in the current or in a user prescribed position at post-failure 
conditions. The second failure type corresponds to a physical destruction and/or deformation 
of the control surface. It consists of a deterioration of the aerodynamic “efficiency” of the 
control surface starting at the occurrence of the failure [16]. The user can select different 
failure parameters such as type, occurrence time, position, and magnitude affecting any of the 
individual eight control surfaces of the baseline aircraft, which is left or right stabilators, 
ailerons, canards, or rudders. 
All the sensors that are typically used in the control laws feedback (e.g. angular rate 









σ  Eq 3-1 
14 
 
where aσ  is a noiseless sensor output and x is the actual measured variable as it results from 
the mathematical model of the aircraft. The sensor output can be expressed in general as: 
 ( )[ ] )t()t(K,),tt()t(K)t()t()t(Kminmax)t( nnminmaxfdbasm σσσσσσ ⋅+−⋅++⋅=  Eq 3-2 
where sK , dK , nK , and bσ  are, respectively, a sensor output scaling factor, a drift factor, a 
noise amplifier, and a bias. The current time is denoted by t and the moment of failure 
occurrence by ft . By properly selecting values for the 8 modeling parameters ( sK , dK , nK , 
bσ , maxσ , and minσ ,) the following types of sensor failures can be simulated:  
• biased sensor output with variable rate 
• drifting output 
• constant or saturated output 
• increased output noise 
A simple model of wing damage was implemented considering both aerodynamic and 
gravimetric effects. It is assumed that the structural damage to the wing will affect the 
aerodynamic forces and moments through the reduction of the aerodynamically active area 
and through the alteration of the aerodynamic characteristics in terms of stability derivatives. 
These effects are modeled using two parameters, a wing area damage factor and an 
aerodynamic damage factor. To model the effects of the wing damage on the gravimetric 
characteristics of the aircraft, the wing area damage factor is used to proportionally reduce the 
total mass of the aircraft and to alter the moments of inertia. Note that the equations of 
motion are still based on the assumptions of constant mass, inertias, and center of mass 
location. The effects of the non-symmetric location of the center of mass after the occurrence 
of the failure are modeled as equivalent alterations of the moment coefficients. 
The following engine failure/malfunction models have initially been included in the 
WVU simulation environment: stuck throttle, thrust runaway, and power/thrust reduced 





3.5 Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
The main portal menu, presented in Figure 3.6, allows the user to select simulation 
under nominal (“healthy”) flight conditions or under abnormal operation of one of the main 
sub-systems: control surfaces, airframe control system sensors, structure, or propulsion. 
Different failure detection schemes can also be selected from this menu. 
The menu presented in Figure 3.7, allows the user to select the source of the input to 
the simulation 
 
Figure 3.6: WVU Simulation Environment – Main Portal Menu 
Should a simulation scenario at abnormal conditions be selected from the menu in 
Figure 3.6 for any of the main aircraft four sub-systems, corresponding input windows are 
opened to allow the user to configure the type, magnitude, and moment of occurrence of the 





Figure 3.7: Selection of Simulation Input Source 
 
Figure 3.8: Selection of Engine Abnormal Operation Condition 
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Two large categories of failures are implemented: failures related to the throttle 
actuator and the command chain between the cockpit and the engine and failures affecting the 
internal actuators or sensors of the engine. Three types of failure directly related to the throttle 
actuator can be selected by checking the input boxes on the left side of the input window. The 
options include stuck throttle at current position or at a user specified position, slow or fast 
thrust runaway, and reduced control efficiency. The magnitude of such a failure can be 
established on this menu as is the moment of occurrence. The specific failed element for an 
internal engine failure is specified using a next window as well as the failure magnitude. Only 
the time of occurrence is input here. Any of the two engines or both can be affected by the 
failures.  
If an internal engine actuator failure is desired, the menu presented in Figure 3.9 is 
opened. It allows the user to specify which engine actuator out of seven will fail, if the failure 
condition involves lockage at current situation or migration to an imposed one, and what the 
magnitude of the failure is. 
 
Figure 3.9: Set-up of Engine Actuator Failure 
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If an internal engine sensor failure is desired, the menu presented in Figure 3.10 is 
opened. It allows the user to specify which engine sensor out of eight will fail, the characteristic 
or type of failure and the magnitude of the failure. The types of failure implemented include: 
sensor output step bias (small or large), sensor output drifting bias (all combinations of large, 
small, fast, and slow), and constant sensor output, either null output or saturated output at the 
minimum or maximum possible value. 
 
Figure 3.10: Set-up of Engine Sensor Failure 
Simulink scopes can be used – as shown in Figure 3.5 – to monitor relevant parameters 
during simulation and/or to investigate their time histories after the simulation. The menu 
presented in Figure 3.11 allows the selection of the aircraft states, controls, and other variables 
to be monitored. The menu presented in Figure 3.12 allows the selection of engine related 













Chapter 4: Engine Model 
4.1 Jet Engine Model 
The engine model developed is designed to integrate with the WVU F-15 Aircraft model; 
therefore, a generic military type jet engine was chosen. Most jet fighter engines are 
low/medium bypass turbofans with a mixed exhaust, afterburner, and variable area final 
nozzle. Since low bypass turbofans are more effective around Mach of 0.75 and the airspeed of 
the flight envelope is centered about this Mach, a low-bypass turbofan is the right selection. 
The engine modeled is a gas powered, high-pressure ratio, dual spool, low by-pass, turbofan 
aircraft engine with a digital controller. The engine components consist of a fan, high-pressure 
compressor (HPC), burner, booster, high-pressure turbine (HPT), low-pressure turbine (LPT), 
bypass duct, mixer, afterburner, and nozzle. These components are shown on the jet engine 
diagram in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1: Diagram of Aircraft Jet Engine [5] 
Also included in Figure 4.1 are the locations where measurements are taken (i.e. areas, 
temperatures, etc.) The parts of the diagram that are of main focus include 7 actuators and 8 
sensors listed in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, respectively. 
Booster Burner LPT Afterburner 
Fan HPC HPT Mixer Nozzle 
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Table 4.1: Actuator Name and Location for Aircraft Jet Engine 
Actuator Location on Figure 2.1 
Main Burner Fuel Flow WF36 
Variable Nozzle Area A8 
Variable Mixer Area A16 
BP Injector Area A14 
Fan Guide Vanes STP2 
HPC Guide Vanes STP27 
Booster Guide Vanes STP27D 
 
Table 4.2: Sensor Name and Location for Aircraft Jet Engine 
Sensor Location on Figure 2.1 
LP Spool Speed XNL 
HP Spool Speed XNH 
HPC Inlet Temperature T27 
HPC Inlet Pressure P27 
HPC Exit Static Pressure PS3 
LPT Exit Temperature T56 
LPT Exit Static Pressure PS56 
Mixer Pressure Ratio N/A (P16/P56) 
 
 Another way to look at the system components is shown in Figure 4.2. (Flow chart from 
FDI Part II) This figure also includes the actuator and sensor locations.  
 
Figure 4.2: Flow Chart of the Different Component Interactions of the Aircraft Jet Engine [5] 
Figure 4.2 illustrates that the first engine component is the fan. The fan and booster are 
powered by the low-pressure turbine (LPT). One shaft called the low-pressure (LP) spool 
connects these components and the LP spool speed sensor measures its speed in revolutions 
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per minute, or RPM’s. The fan supplies air to the engine core as well as the bypass (BP) duct. 
The air in the bypass duct mixes with the low pressure turbine exhaust before flowing through 
the mixed flow nozzle. The high-pressure compressor (HPC) is driven by the high-pressure 
turbine (HPT). The speed of the connecting high-pressure (HP) shaft is measured as the HP 
spool speed in RPM’s.  
The low bypass ratio turbofan has a multi-stage fan which develops at relatively high 
pressure ratio and yields a high exhaust velocity. This low bypass ratio military type engine has 
variable inlet guide vanes, which directs air onto the first rotor stage and improves the fan 
surge margin in the mid-flow range [17]. 
An important part of the engine is the afterburner, which is a combustor located 
between the turbine blades and the nozzle. The afterburner has its own specific fuel injectors. 
The temperature of the exhaust gases increases significantly when the afterburner is lit creating 
higher exhaust velocity and thrust. To accommodate this extra flow, the variable nozzle area 
must increase. Since the afterburner uses a lot of fuel to create the thrust increase, it cannot be 
used at all times [17]. 
4.2 Linear Engine Model 
Using a nonlinear model for this project to include the main internal engine sub-systems 
was not feasible. MAPSS is a non-real time model and as such cannot be interfaced with the 
motion-based simulator. Besides, most of the internal structure of the model is not accessible 
to a user for failure/malfunction modeling. Instead, a linear model was obtained using the 
MAPSS program and was interfaced with the WVU F-15 model. MAPSS first makes profiles of 
the operating conditions including the inputs (PLA, Mach, and altitude) versus time. The user 
decides the profiles to use. Here, the input values are constant over time. However, in order to 
get to the input values for the linear model, the values had to increase over the profiles. Figure 




Figure 4.3: Main Menu for the Modular Aero-Propulsion System Simulation [6]  
To find the input values some trial and error was needed. The original aircraft engine 
model was used to find the thrust value at Mach of 0.75 and altitude of 20000ft. This value was 
26200N for both engines combined, which is equivalent to 13100N or 2945lbf. Now, the same 
Mach and altitude are run in the MAPSS model with varying PLA values. The PLA is updated 
until the thrust output of MAPSS matches the thrust output of the aircraft model. This was also 
verified using a linear equation to find PLA. MAPSS was run with two PLA values and constant 
Mach and altitude to find the net thrust, fn, at each point. For a PLA input of 26.0deg, Mach of 
0.75, and altitude of 20000ft, the net thrust is 1745lbf. For a PLA input of 30.0deg, Mach of 0.75 








which can be used in the linear equation 
  Eq 4-2 





Finally the linear equation to calculate PLA is  
 
 Eq 4-4 
With the desired thrust of 2945lbf used, the PLA input should be 30.55deg. However, MAPSS 
only recognizes up to the tenths; therefore, 30.5deg is used as the linearization point. The 
thrust output from MAPSS is shown in Figure 4.4. The PLA value of 30.5deg reaches a steady-
state thrust of 2931.5lbf. Now the engine model is linearized around Mach of 0.75, altitude of 
20000ft, and PLA of 30.5deg.  
 
Figure 4.4: Net Thrust from MAPSS for PLA of 30.5deg, Mach of 0.75, and Altitude of 20000ft 
Once the linearization is complete, MAPSS provides matrices A, B, C, and D needed for a 
state-space model as well as the input, output, and state trim values. The input values, U, are 
the burner fuel flow, nozzle exit area, and bypass exit area. The states, X, are the low-pressure 






















rotor speed, high-pressure rotor speed, and the average hot section metal temperature, which 
are determined by the PI control action in the controller. Finally, the output values, Y, are the 
calculated and sensed outputs from the CLM.  
Now, the new engine model is created from the linear model matrices and the main 
components of the MAPSS model. The Simulink® model of the system in shown in Figure 4.5. 
The ‘Controller and Sensor’ block contains the sensor dynamics, atmospheric conditions, and 
the digital controller. The ‘Actuator Dynamics’ block calculates the movements of the actuators. 
The inputs of this system are the PLA, Mach, and altitude from the pilot controller joystick and 
the main output is the thrust, which continues through the aircraft model. However, the 
actuator and sensor outputs are also used later.  
 
Figure 4.5: Linearized Engine Model in Simulink 
Finally, this linear engine model is tested using the same constant input parameters and 
the MAPSS simulation. Figure 4.6 shows the net thrust output from the linear engine model 
compared to the thrust output from MAPSS. The steady-state thrust response from the linear 




Figure 4.6: Plot of Net Thrust versus Time from MAPSS and Linear Engine Models 
Since this linear engine model was created about three specific input points, the model 
is not valid for all flight conditions. Standard atmospheric conditions apply to altitudes up to 
30000ft, where the values for temperature and pressure will begin to change. For these tests, 
the flight envelope is limited to approximately 30000ft. Also, the PLA levels for the MAPSS 
system are low, medium, and high [5]. Since the operating point is 30.5, the joystick throttle 
input must be converted to a linear PLA value. Since 37.5 is the upper limit for the medium 
power level and testing shows that 21.0 is the minimum option, the PLA input must stay within 
this range. The PLA value of 30.5 must correspond to zero throttle input; therefore the 
minimum and maximum PLA input is between 23.5 and 37.5deg, respectively. This means that 
there is never a true maximum thrust for the system and it doesn’t quite react the way the 
actual engine would.  
4.3 Example of Healthy System Simulation 
To gain perspective on the dynamics of the engine model, testing was performed to 
show the response to standard throttle inputs. The output plots of this test show how each 
parameter reacts to the given input. This shows which parameters are more likely to be 
affected by the failure inputs later and which may not be affected at all. It is important to note 























that many of the parameter responses resemble second order responses as opposed to 
expected first order responses. There was a question as to whether this was due to inaccuracy 
of the linearized model or the engine modeling of the actuator and sensor dynamics. Additional 
tests were performed which confirm that the responses are valid for the PLA inputs used. 
The first of the plots for nominal conditions is in Figure 4.7, which includes the single 
engine thrust, velocity, and altitude. As shown in the figure, the thrust output follows closely 
along with the throttle input. The velocity remains close to constant while the throttle is at 50% 
and increases or decreases while the throttle is increased or decreased. The altitude also shows 
a response even though the other pilot controls were held steady. However, the change is 
within about plus or minus 5 ft so it is only minor.  
The next plot, Figure 4.8, contains the response of four of the seven actuators, which 
consist of the burner fuel flow, the nozzle throat area, the aft VABI (mixer) area, and the bypass 
injector area. As the plot shows, the burner fuel flow follows the path of the throttle deflection 
with some overshoot. This is because the throttle controls the fuel to the burner in order to 
increase or decrease the thrust. As explained in Chapter 2, an increase in thrust corresponds to 
an increase in the volume of flow through the engine, and an increase in the nozzle area is 
required to compensate. Therefore, the nozzle area also follows the path of the throttle input. 
Next, the mixer area has peaks that correspond to the changes in the throttle but remains semi-
constant while the throttle is constant, despite the magnitude. Also shown is that the area 
decreases or increases as the throttle change is positive or negative, respectively. The bypass 
injector area shown as the last subplot in Figure 4.8 remains constant throughout the test. This 
is due to the fact that the bypass area is an either all or nothing deal. Once the PLA input 
triggers the area to open the area is 150.8. This area will remain until the PLA decreases enough 
to trigger the area to close [5]. Due to initial conditions, the area will always begin at the open 
position. Now, say the threshold to trigger opening is 30deg and the threshold to trigger closing 
is 25deg. Once the area is open, the PLA will have a decrease drastically to reach the value to 









Figure 4.8: Standard Throttle Input Response at Nominal Conditions (2) 
The next figure contains the response for the remaining actuators, including the fan 
stator vanes, the HPC stator vanes, and the booster stator vanes. All of these guide vanes follow 
the opposite profile from the throttle input, whereas the angle of each actuator decreases as 
the throttle increases, remains mostly constant as the throttle does, and increases as the 




Figure 4.9: Standard Throttle Input Response at Nominal Conditions (3) 
Figure 4.10 displays the response of the LP spool speed, HP spool speed, HPC inlet 
temperature, and LPT exit temperature sensors. The profiles of the LP spool speed, HP spool 
speed and HPC inlet temperature all have the same profile as that throttle input. The spool 
speeds logically follow the path of the throttle since they drive the compressor and turbines. 
Increased spool speed will increase air flow to increase thrust and vice versa. The LPT exit 
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temperature, however, remains fairly constant with spikes corresponding to the throttle 
changes.  
 
Figure 4.10: Standard Throttle Input Response at Nominal Conditions (4) 
The final plot for healthy conditions is Figure 4.11 which contains the responses of the 
sensors pertaining to pressure. Each of the pressure sensors also follows the profile of the 
throttle input. The pressure in the engine increases and decreases as the throttle does. The 
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bottom subplot is for the mixer pressure ratio response. This sensor remains at approximately 
1.05 for all constant throttle inputs and has spikes when the throttle changes. These spikes will 
initially decrease as the throttle increases and vice versa.  
 




Chapter 5: Engine Failure Model 
5.1 Types of Failures 
The failures on the engines include stuck throttle, thrust runaway, reduced efficiency, 
stuck engine actuator, and biased and stuck engine sensor. The failures can be applied one at a 
time on either the left engine, right engine, or both engines. The time of the failure is inputted 
into the GUI as well as the parameters needed for the particular failure. Descriptions of each 
failure follow.  
The stuck throttle failure implies normal operation of the engine but no response to 
power lever actuation. In the case of stuck throttle at current position the throttle )t(κ  
















κ  Eq 5-1 
For the stuck at imposed position option, the user provides a throttle value between 0.0 and 
1.0 at which the throttle remains constant for ftt ≥ .    
The thrust runaway failure models a malfunction of the fuel control system, which 
causes the increase of the fuel flow to maximum and the increase of the thrust as a result. This 
is modeled by increasing the throttle to maximum with first order dynamics and time constant 


























κκκ  Eq 5-2 
The power/thrust reduced control efficiency is modeled by scaling down the throttle 














)(κ  Eq 5-3 
For 0K ef = , total loss of power is simulated. 
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The first three failures mentioned directly affect the thrust of the engine without 
involving the other components of the engine model. The engine actuators and sensors failures 
on the other hand, are somewhat more complex affecting the other actuator and sensors in the 
engine and along with the thrust.  
The actuators used in the failure model include the burner fuel flow, nozzle area, mixer 
area, BP injector area, fan guide vanes, HPC guide vanes, and booster guide vanes. The options 
for the failure are an inputted value for the fuel flow (lbm/hr), locked at current or imposed 
values for the areas (in2), and locked at current or imposed deflections for the guide vanes 
(deg). Each actuator block within the engine model contains a failure block. This block 
continues with normal operation of the engine but with no response to the power lever 
actuation. For option involving imposed values, the actuator goes to and remains at that 
constant value for ftt ≥ . Similarly, the actuator remains constant at the value reached at the 














)(  Eq 5-4 
The sensors failures were applied to eight of the 22 sensors in the engine model. These 
particular sensors were chosen because they are involved in the control of the engine model. 
The sensors included are the LP spool speed, HP spool speed, HPC inlet temperature, LPT exit 
temperature, HPC inlet pressure, HPC exit static pressure, LPT exit static pressure at mixer and 
mixer pressure ratio. The options to apply to the sensors are a large or small step bias; large or 
small fast drifting bias; large or small slow drifting bias; or a constant value of 0, minimum, or 
maximum.  
The minimum and maximum are based on the individual sensor. For the constant value 
failures, the measured sensor output, )(tmσ , goes to and remains at the selected constant 























)(  Eq 5-5 
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In Eq 5-5, dK  is the drifting factor, bσ  is the magnitude of the bias and t∆  is the time interval 














)(  Eq 5-6 






 Eq 5-7 
For the case of a step bias sensor failure, dK  and t∆  are 0, and bσ  is simply 0 or bσ . The 
general formula to represent the measured sensor output is 
 ( )( )minmax ,),()(minmax)( σσσσσ ttt bam +=  Eq 5-8 
where aσ  is the actual sensor value, and minσ  and maxσ  are the thresholds of the sensor. 
5.2 Example of Unhealthy System Simulation 
With the engine failure models in place, it is important to see how each one affects the 
nominal flight conditions. Using the same standard throttle input as for the healthy data, the 
response of the healthy engine versus the unhealthy engine is plotted. Since there are so many 
parameters to plot, only one example is discussed in this section. The failure responses of the 
other failures can be found in Appendix A. In this section, failure of the burner fuel flow valve is 
displayed and discussed. For the following plots, a left engine burner fuel flow failure at 0lbm/hr 
is injected into the simulation at 5sec. This is a strong failure; therefore, the effects on the 
parameters are large and easy to see. Since this is such a strong failure, however, the engine 
model cannot properly model all of the parameters, so the values will go to the thresholds of 
the model.  
In Figure 5.1 through Figure 5.5, the failed left engine is represented by a solid line while 
the healthy right engine is shown as a dotted line. Figure 5.1 has the results for the burner fuel 
flow, throttle input, and thrust output. While the right engine follows the throttle input as it did 
before, the left engine quickly reaches 0lbm/hr for the burner fuel flow and approximately -
700lbf for the thrust. The thrust in this case is negative due to the engine creating only drag 
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after the failure, since a fuel flow failure at 0lbm/hr essentially turns off the engine. The rest of 
the parameters in Figure 5.2 through Figure 5.5 react in a similar way, as expected. The right, 
healthy engine carries on following basically the same profiles as before while the actuators 
and sensors of the left, unhealthy, engine reach a constant values shortly after the failure and 
remain there throughout the test.  
 



























Chapter 6: Failure Detection 
6.1 Artificial Immune System 
Living organisms are endowed with mechanisms that detect intruding pathogens and 
destroy them to protect the host from diseases. This important function is performed by the 
biological immune system. In particular, so-called T cells are produced in the thymus [18] that 
exhibit features that are unlike any cell in the organism. These features are strings of organic 
chemical compounds, which are produced during a quasi-random cell generation process. 
Those T-cells who end up having such strings that are similar to the ones of the organism, are 
destroyed. The ones that are different are allowed to mature and then released into the blood 
stream. This process is referred to as negative selection. If these T-cells encounter another cell 
that matches their own chemical string, then they have encountered a cell that does not belong 
to the organism and they mark it for destruction.  
The operation of the biological immune system generated the idea to use similar 
mechanisms for fault detection for engineering systems. If a current configuration of “features” 
(current measured data that play the role of the intruding cell) matches any configuration (T-
cell), referred to as a detector, known NOT to be a normal condition, then an abnormal 
condition or failure may be declared. These “features” can include various sensor outputs, 
states estimates, statistical parameters, or any other information expected to be relevant to the 
behavior of the system referred to as the “self”. All regions of the hyperspace defined by the 
“features” that do not belong to the “self” are referred to as “non-self”. Extensive experimental 
data are necessary to determine the “self” or the region of the hyperspace corresponding to 
normal conditions. Adequate numerical representations of the self/non-self must be used and 
the data processed such that they are manageable. The detectors must then be generated and 
optimized and finally, detection logic must be designed for real time operation with high 
detection rate and low number of false alarms. 
The Artificial Immune System (AIS) - as a new computational paradigm in artificial 
intelligence – has been applied in recent years to solve a large variety of problems, such as 
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anomaly detection [19, 20], pattern recognition [21, 22], data mining [23], computer security  
[24, 25], adaptive control [26, 27], and fault detection [29]. The immunity-based fault detection 
for aircraft has also been investigated [28, 29].  
An integrated framework for the detection, identification, and evaluation of a wide 
variety of sensor, actuator, propulsion, and structural failures/damages using the bio-immune 
system metaphor has been formulated and implemented at WVU [30]. Interactive 
computational tools based on evolutionary algorithms have been developed for the generation 
and optimization of artificial immune system-based failure detectors using the negative 
selection strategy [31]. The utility performs the design of an AIS in three different phases. A 
preliminary phase consists of processing data from flight simulation tests for “self” definition 
through normalization, duplicate removal, and clustering. A first phase of the evolutionary 
algorithm produces a sub-optimal set of detectors. An iterative algorithm generates detectors 
that do not overlap with the “self” and achieve a prescribed level of coverage of the “non-self”. 
A second phase consists of a classic genetic algorithm that optimizes the set of detectors based 
on three criteria. These criteria are: minimum number of detectors, minimum overlapping 
between detectors, and maximum coverage of the “non-self”.  
The main steps in generating and using AIS-based detectors for engine abnormal 
condition detection are (see also Figure 6.1): 
1. Definition of “features” or “identifiers” that define the operation of the system and 
are capable of capturing the signature of the failures that must be detected.  
2. Acquisition of flight simulation data at nominal conditions over a desired region of the 
flight envelope for AIS training and validation (determination of false alarms). Acquisition of 
flight simulation data at abnormal conditions (with failures) for detection scheme testing and 
evaluation (determination of detection rates). 
3. Flight simulation data processing for self definition. 
4. Generation of detectors through negative selection. 
5. Detection scheme formulation and testing using data at failure conditions. 





Figure 6.1: Artificial Immune System-Based Abnormal Condition Detection [30] 
6.2 Selection of Features for the Definition of Self 
The selection of the features for the definition of the self is a critical process for the 
success of the detection scheme, which will depend on the capability of these selected 
parameters to capture the dynamic signature of all failures targeted.  
A list of candidate features has first been formulated. It included throttle input, thrust, 
the seven engine actuators and the eight engine sensor outputs available within the engine 
model. Simulation of failures affecting the throttle, three engine actuators, and three engine 
sensors has been performed and the effects on candidate features analyzed. These effects were 
evaluated on a four-level scale, major (+++), moderate (++), minor (+), insignificant (0) as shown 
in Table 6.1. A list of 5 successful candidates was then selected such that the signatures of all 
failures considered are likely to be captured. The selected features are: 
• Throttle Command 
• Mixer Area Actuator 
• Fan Guide Vane Deflection 
• HPC Exit Temperature Sensor  
• Mixer Pressure Ratio Sensor 
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6.3 Data Processing and Detector Generation 
The WVU AIS interactive design environment [31] developed in Matlab was used for the 
purpose of this research effort. The main portal to the WVU AIS design environment is 




Figure 6.2: Main Menu of the WVU AIS Design Environment [31] 
The WVU AIS Design Environment goes through a step-by-step process leading to the 
detectors, or antibodies, of the system. The first step is to load and process the raw data from 
the nominal flight tests. In the case of building the self, “processing” the data translates to 
normalizing and removing the duplicate data points. The duplicate elimination is performed 
because multiple data at the same point are undesirable and unneeded. Having duplicate data 
points will unnecessarily increase the computational effort. The menu for this procedure is 
shown in Figure 6.3. Since several tests at nominal conditions were included in the self, some of 
the data were merged before processing. However, the processing was not simply performed 
on the set of all data because the resulting file was too large. In order for the detection 
generation process to work correctly, all of the different data sets had to be normalized to the 
same factors. The maximums and minimums were found by merging all of the data together 
and performing only the normalization. Then the multiple merged data sets were processed 




Figure 6.3: Data Processing Menu 
The next step toward creating the self is to cluster the processed data. The menu for this 
is shown in Figure 6.4. The processed data are loaded and then the user chooses the 
parameters for clustering, for which the values chosen are based on previous research. Once 
clusters are generated for all sets of training data, the clusters are merged together. This can 




Figure 6.4: Clustering Menu 
With the final set of clusters created, the total number being about 13600, the detector 
generation can begin. First, the merged cluster file is loaded into the program. Then, Negative 
Selection and Create Detectors (Phase I only) are chosen from the Detector Optimization menu. 
The menu for Phase I is shown in Figure 6.5. Using only Phase I means that detectors are only 
generated and no optimization is performed. For the antibodies, the shapes were spheres with 
variable radii. The maximum number of detectors was set to 1000, but the final number of 
detectors was 991. These detectors can now be validated and applied to the failure tests. This is 














Chapter 7: Data Acquisition  
7.1 Flight Plan 
In previous research using the artificial immune system paradigm at WVU [32], the flight 
data used to train the self included all paths of the flight envelope shown in Figure 7.1. To 
validate the system, flight tests were performed at points A, B, C, and D and then run through 
the detection scheme. The results showed that training the AIS for the surrounding flight paths 
(numbered points) was sufficient to cover the area in between the lines (lettered points) [32]. 
 
Figure 7.1: F15 Flight Envelope 
For this experiment, the research was pushed farther to see if using only the center lines 
including points one, two, four, six and eight to train the system would be sufficient to create 
an accurate self. In other words, the pilot would start at point 1, accelerate to point 4, 
decelerate to point 8, return to point 1, ascend to point 2, descend to point 6, and return to 
point 1. Typical maneuvers were performed throughout these tests. Actually, the test was 
broken in two to keep the data files smaller and from having to repeat long tests in case of 
error.  
Preliminary testing showed that training the system on paths one to two to six and one 
to four to eight did not contain all data needed to sufficiently cover flight from point one to 
























training data and resulted in low false alarms. The validation results are farther discussed in 
Chapter 8. 
In every test, the pilot performed three thrust doublets and three yaw doublets at 
different magnitudes/speeds. Since the engine performance was in question, the most 
important maneuvers came from the throttle and yaw inputs. The throttle controls the function 
of the engine while the difference in thrust from the healthy and unhealthy engines affects 
yaw; therefore, normal function of these maneuvers was needed. 
The same process was used to test several engine failures. Each failure was performed 
along the paths one to two to six and one to two to six including the doublets at each point. All 
of the failures were performed on the left engine with some failures also performed on the 
right engine. This showed, as expected, that there was no difference between the two.  
7.2 Flight Testing  
All flight testing was performed by student and faculty volunteer pilots in the WVU 6 
degrees-of-freedom flight simulator. The WVU Motus 600 Flight Simulator, shown in Figure 7.2, 
was manufactured by Fidelity Flight Simulation, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA. The components of the 
simulator include 
• 6 DOF motion platform driven by electrical induction motors 
• Laminar Research X-Plane flight simulation software 
• LCD mosaic wall four-monitor external visual display 
• Instructor operating station 




Figure 7.2: WVU 6-DOF Flight Simulator 
The motion based platform shown in Figure 7.3 provides six-degrees-of-freedom 
translational and rotational motion cues. Electrical motors are used to drive the motion base, 
which represents a very versatile and inexpensive solution to this type of application. Motion 
drive algorithms convert the motion of the aircraft as resulting from the dynamic model into 
motion of the platform such that the perception of the pilot is optimized within the physical 
limitations of the ground based simulator. 
 
Figure 7.3: WVU 6-DOF Flight Simulator Flight Cabin System 
 
Access Platform 





The WVU Flight Simulator works with a commercial aircraft simulation package called X-
Plane [13]. X-Plane features high capabilities and flexibility in selecting the simulation scenario. 
The 2-seat cockpit, shown in Figure 7.4 houses dual controls and instrument clusters. 6 LCD 
displays visually present information in the cockpit. Two of these visual displays are dedicated 
to the instrument clusters while the other four provide external (environmental) visual cues.  
 
Figure 7.4: Visual Displays, Controls, and Instrument Cluster 
The instructor console previously illustrated in Figure 7.2 has two visual displays to 
monitor the simulation and to perform simulation scenario set-ups/changes. A better view of 
the instructor operating station located on the access platform is shown in Figure 7.5. 
 
Figure 7.5: Instructor Console 
The large black aluminum cabinet next to the cabin in Figure 7.2 houses all electrical and 
computing hardware. Five computers are used to operate the WVU Flight Simulator. Computer 









displays. Computer #3 drives the right 45° visual display. Computer #4 is the “Server” computer 
and runs the core flight simulation software and the pilots’ instruments. All simulation data to 
be used for analysis is stored on this computer. Computer #5 is the instructor’s operating 
station. All 5 computers can be controlled using the keyboard on the instructor’s desk. All 
functions of the motion base can be controlled through a separate Motion Control Box, also 
shown in Figure 7.5. 
A total of 34 flight simulator tests with three different pilots have been performed for 
the purpose of the project, adding up to approximately 20 hours of testing including integration 
of engine model with flight simulator, pilot preliminary training, simulator preparation, and 
data retrieval. Pilot #1 performed approximately 13 hours of the testing while Pilot #2 and Pilot 




Chapter 8: Simulation Results and Discussion 
8.1 Validation at Nominal Conditions 
In all the figures showing testing results within this chapter, the top subplot shows the 
normalized data for all the identifiers used to build the self. These parameters include the 
throttle command, mixer area, fan guide vanes, HPC temperature, and mixer pressure ratio. 
The plots typically show more variation of the parameters during the doublets and smoother 
sections while the pilot accelerated, etc., to a new point in the flight envelope. It is important to 
note that the throttle command is represented by the joystick signal with inverted sign as well 
as normalized between 0 and 1; therefore, when the value is low or decreasing, the pilot was 
accelerating. The bottom subplot shows the number of antibodies (or detectors) that detected 
failure over a previous time window of 1 second. When the plot shows a zero value then no 
abnormal condition is detected, while a non-zero value means exactly the opposite. The highest 
value of activated antibodies is always 50 since the sampling rate used in the detection scheme 
was 50Hz. 
The flight test for validation of the AIS at nominal conditions consisted of doublets 
performed at point 1, acceleration and ascension to point 3, and doublets performed at point 3. 
The data from this test was normalized and used to test the antibodies. An attempt was first 
made to determine the level of robustness of the data acquisition process in capturing self 
characteristics over extended regions of the flight envelope. Preliminary research has shown 
that data acquired over the contour of the box in Figure 7.1 plus the internal cross-like 
segments were enough to represent the self at all points inside the box. Therefore, a first self 
was obtained based on tests along the cross-like segments only. This preliminary self created 
from the training data resulted in the generation of 1000 antibodies. The results of the 
validation flight test using the first set of antibodies are shown in Figure 8.1. These results show 
the number of false alarms to be very high, approximately 62%. Also shown in Figure 8.1 is the 
fact that the false alarms do not occur during flight at point 1, where training data was 
available, but rather in the vicinity of point 3. The rate increased shortly after acceleration and 
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ascension to point 3 began (around 250sec). This preliminary test shows that the generation of 
the self must include additional information at flight conditions close to point 3.  
 
 
Figure 8.1: Preliminary False Alarms for Left Engine Validation Data for Flight Path 1 to 3 
To more clearly understand this conclusion, the 2-D plots in Figure 8.2 and Figure 8.3 are 
used to illustrate the difference in the points included in the self and points from the validation 
data for the left engine. Figure 8.2 shows that about half of the red validation data points are 
within the green cluster data, which represents the nominal flight at point 1. The other section 
of data corresponding to the vicinity of point 3 is outside of the self, which the antibodies 
viewed as unhealthy flight data causing the false alarms. Figure 8.3 uses two different 





















































identifiers to show the same results with about half of the validation data outside of the self 
cluster data. 
 
Figure 8.2: Normalized Validation Data compared to Self Cluster Data for Throttle Command 
versus Mixer Area 
 
Figure 8.3: Normalized Validation Data compared to Self Cluster Data for Fan Guide Vanes 
versus HPC Temperature 



















































Since these preliminary results clearly show that the training data was not adequate to 
create an accurate self, more training was added around point 3 of the flight envelope. This 
data included two flight tests. One flying from point one to 2 to 3 with the doublets performed 
at point 3 and another from 1 to 4 to 3 with doublets at point 3. The new antibodies created 
from this data yielded the results shown in Figure 8.4. Note that the validation data used in this 
test was the exact data used in Figure 8.1. With false alarms of less than 0.6%, the validation 
results are excellent.  
 
Figure 8.4: False Alarms for Left Engine Validation Data for Flight Path 1 to 3 
The new 2-D plots are also included in Figure 8.5 and Figure 8.6 to show the difference 
from the previous self. Although not all of the validation data is included in the self, enough is 
added to significantly decrease the number of false alarms and increase the validity of the self. 





















































This also shows that only training the system for the middle part of the flight envelope is not 
adequate to represent the flight at the other points. It does, however, show that continuing to 
train around the outside of a section can be enough to represent flight in the middle. This result 
confirms the level of “robustness” previously determined in the acquisition of data for self 
definition. 
 
Figure 8.5: Normalized Validation Data compared to New Self Cluster Data for Throttle 
Command versus Mixer Area 
 


























Figure 8.6: Normalized Validation Data compared to New Self Cluster Data for Fan Guide 
Vanes versus HPC Temperature 
8.2 Throttle Failure 
One of the strongest engine failures is the throttle stuck at zero. This means close to 
zero thrust will be produced by the unhealthy engine. This failure should be easily detected due 
to its impact on the engine functionality. Another reason to analyze this failure was to compare 
it with the detection rate using the previous engine model. The stuck throttle failure was 
performed on both the left and right engines. In this case, the failure was too strong to 
accelerate or ascend to other points of the flight envelope; therefore, the flight tests were 
broken into sections. These figures are set up like the previous figures for validation. The only 
difference is now the detection rate is included with the false alarms. The green part of the 
bottom subplot on each figure represents the false alarms that occur during nominal flight 
before the failure is injected. The number of false alarms must remain low for all failure tests to 
justify the AIS. The red section of the subplot represents detection of the failure. Basically, the 
more red area shown in the plot, the better the detection rate. Figure 8.7 and Figure 8.8 show 
the stuck throttle detection at point one of the flight envelope. Figure 8.7 for the left engine 




























shows a good detection rate at just under 95% with no false alarms. The right engine also had 
good results with no false alarms and over 90% detection rate. The only gaps in these two plots 
seem to come when the throttle is decreasing, which coincides with engine burnout. This may 
be corrected by including a temperature sensor as an identifier to detect the decrease in 
temperature during burnout.  
 
Figure 8.7: Left Engine Stuck Throttle Failure at 40sec for Flight at Point 1 

























































Figure 8.8: Right Engine Stuck Throttle Failure at 40sec for Flight at Point 1 
The next part of the flight envelope to be tested includes points 4 and 8, corresponding 
to changing Mach and constant altitude. The failure occurs at 60sec in these tests in order to 
give the pilot time to accelerate to point 4 first since the speed decreases rapidly after the 
failure. Figure 8.9 shows the results of the left engine failure. The detection rate here is still 
high at about 86% with very low false alarms of 3%. The small number of false alarms is most 
likely due to the sudden pilot acceleration while the gap in the detection was during steady 
deceleration to point 8, which may not have had enough throttle excitation to show the failure. 
























































Figure 8.9: Left Engine Stuck Throttle Failure at 60sec for Flight Path 4 to 8 
Figure 8.10 shows similar results for the right engine with a detection rate of about 80% 
but with zero false alarms. The breaks in detection again correspond to deceleration to point 8 
and the decreasing part of the throttle doublets.  
 
























































Figure 8.10: Right Engine Stuck Throttle Failure at 60sec for Flight Path 4 to 8 
The final section of the flight envelope to test includes points 2 and 6, which holds Mach 
steady and varies the altitude. The failure occurs at 240sec for this test since the pilot had to 
climb before the failure. The detection rate this time was smaller than before, but still a solid 
value at 67% with very low false alarms. These false alarms correspond to the initial pilot 
maneuvers while the decrease in the detection rate matches the time when the pilot slowly 
descends to point 6. Here, there is basically no pilot input while the aircraft goes to the new 
altitude.  
























































Figure 8.11: Left Engine Stuck Throttle Failure at 240sec for Flight Path 2 to 6 
All of these results can be compared to the previous engine failure detection rates and 
false alarms. The most comparable scenario to evaluate the improvement of the AIS failure 
detection is the 98% reduced efficiency engine failure for the reduced flight envelope [32]. The 
thrust data from the throttle failure tests show that the failed engine was functioning at 
approximately 13% of the healthy engine and therefore corresponds to an 87% reduced 
efficiency engine failure. Comparison of the detection schemes is included later in this chapter. 
  























































8.3 Engine Actuator Failures 
Several actuator failures were tested in the flight simulator to find the detection rate 
and number of false alarms. The actuator failure included the burner fuel flow stuck at 0lbm/hr, 
the nozzle area locked at the area at the time of failure, and the mixer area locked at the area 
at the time of failure.  
8.3.1 Burner Fuel Flow Valve Failure 
The most beneficial test here was the burner fuel flow. This failure was much like the 
stuck throttle failure and can be easily compared to previous research results. Setting the 
burner fuel flow to 0, however, was a stronger failure in the fact that the thrust from the 
unhealthy engine was negative, since the engine was producing drag. The burner failure was 
tested for both the left and right engines. The following figures show the results.  
Figure 8.12 and Figure 8.13 both test a left engine failure at 60sec for flight at point one 
while Figure 8.14 contains the results of the right engine failure. Both of the left engine tests 
and the right engine test have very high, over 99.9%, detection rates with no false alarms. The 





Figure 8.12: Left Engine Burner Fuel Flow Failure at 40sec for Flight at Point 1 
 


























































Figure 8.13: Left Engine Burner Fuel Flow Failure at 40sec for Flight at Point 1 
 


























































Figure 8.14: Right Engine Burner Fuel Flow Failure at 40sec for Flight at Point 1 
The flight tests to cover points 4 and 8 of the flight envelope have the same results as 
point 1. The failure in Figure 8.15 and Figure 8.16 for the left and right engine, respectively, 
occurs at 60sec to allow the pilot time to accelerate before the failure. With detection rates 
over 99.9% and zero false alarms, the results of these flight tests are outstanding.  


























































Figure 8.15: Left Engine Burner Fuel Flow Failure at 60sec for Flight Path 4 to 8 
 


























































Figure 8.16: Right Engine Burner Fuel Flow Failure at 60sec for Flight Path 4 to 8 
The final test for the burner fuel flow area involves flight at points 2 and 6. In this case, 
the failure in implemented at 480sec. This allows the pilot to ascend to point 2 more slowly and 
hopefully decrease the false alarms compared to Figure 8.11. This is successful with false alarms 
of less than 1% and detection again over 99.9%. These results will later be compared to the 
previous research. Even though this failure is somewhat stronger, it is still comparable to the 
failed throttle results. The equivalent reduced engine efficiency failure would be at 
approximately 113%. 

























































Figure 8.17: Left Engine Burner Fuel Flow Failure at 480sec for Flight Path 2 to 6 
8.3.2 Nozzle Area Actuator Failure 
While failure of the nozzle area does not have as big of an impact on the flight as the 
previous failures, the actuator controlling the nozzle area is an important part of the engine; 
therefore, detection of the actuator malfunction is desired. The results from the flight tests are 
shown in Figure 8.18 for a left engine failure along the path from 1 to 4 to 8. The detection rate 
appears to be very low for this type of failure; however, the same failure is detected at a very 
good rate of 55% with no false alarms if it occurs at different flight conditions as shown in 
Figure 8.19. This result suggests that although the set of features selected to define the self is 


























































adequate, the detector generation process failed to produce detectors in regions of the hyper 
space corresponding to the flight path 1-4-8. This may be due to a too “generous” clustering 
process with the inclusion of large “empty spaces” and/or to low coverage of the non-self 
during the detector generation. In both situations, areas of the non-self are considered normal 
and therefore lead to poor detection. The complete optimization of the detector set using both 
phase I and phase II of the evolutionary algorithm [ref] is expected to considerably improve the 
detection in this area of the flight envelope. 
 
Figure 8.18: Left Engine Nozzle Area Actuator Failure at 40sec for Flight Path 1 to 4 to 8 
 
 
























































Figure 8.19: Left Engine Nozzle Area Actuator Failure at 40sec for Flight Path 1 to 2 to 6 
8.3.3 Mixer Area Actuator Failure 
Next, the actuator controlling the mixer area was locked at the current position. This 
failure had good results for all tests, which are shown in Figure 8.20, Figure 8.21, and Figure 
8.22. The flight path from point 1 to 4 to 8 and back to 1 was performed during failure on the 
left and then the right engine. Both tests yield a detection rate of about 67% and no false 
alarms. In Figure 8.20 and Figure 8.21, the detection is not very good while the aircraft is flying 
at point 1 and accelerating to point 4. However, once at point 4, the detection is much better.  
























































Figure 8.20: Left Engine Mixer Area Actuator Failure at 40sec for Flight Path 1 to 4 to 8 
 


























































Figure 8.21: Right Engine Mixer Area Actuator Failure at 40sec for Flight Path 1 to 4 to 8 
The mixer area failure applied to the flight path 1 to 2 to 6 and back to 1 has an 
increased detection rate at 89% and still no false alarms. Similar to the previous plots, Figure 
8.22 has a decreased detection rate at point 1 until ascension to point 2 begins. This could 
mean that the mixer area does not change significantly from throttle doublets around point 1 
and must be excited more by changing the Mach or altitude. Although it is desirable to detect 
the failure at the time of the occurrence, at least the system does detect the failure when it 
starts to affect the engine parameters.  


























































Figure 8.22: Left Engine Mixer Area Actuator Failure at 40sec for Flight Path 1 to 2 to 6 
8.4 Engine Sensor Failures 
The sensor failures chosen for flight testing were the LP spool speed locked at the 
minimum value; the LPT exit static pressure locked at zero and the minimum value; and the 
mixer pressure ratio locked at the maximum value. These failures were chosen because they 
had a visible effect of the engine parameters as shown in the Appendix.  
 
 

























































8.4.1 LP Spool Speed Sensor Failure 
The LP spool speed failure was performed on the left engine over two flight tests. The 
results are shown in Figure 8.23 and Figure 8.24. The detection rate for flight at points 1, 4, and 
8 was 47% with zero false alarms. With this failure, the flight at point 1 did not seem to excite 
the system enough for good detection. Also, the section with poor detection from 
approximately 375sec to 700sec contains lower throttle values to fly to and at point 8.  
 
Figure 8.23: Left Engine LP Spool Speed Sensor Failure at 40 sec for Flight Path 1 to 4 to 8 
The detection rate shown in Figure 8.24, which includes flight at points 2 and 6, is better 
at 62% with no false alarms. However, the same issues occur at point 1 and while the pilot 
descends using low throttle input.  
























































Figure 8.24: Left Engine LP Spool Speed Sensor Failure at 40sec for Flight Path 1 to 2 to 6 
8.4.2 LPT Exit Static Pressure Sensor Failure 
The next sensor to test was the LPT exit static pressure sensor. This failure was 
performed for both a zero constant value and the minimum constant value. Figure 8.25 and 
Figure 8.26 show the results of the zero constant failure. Figure 8.25 has a detection rate of 
96% and false alarms of 0% for flight at points 1, 4, and 8. The flight test at points 1, 2, and 6 
shown in Figure 8.26 has a smaller, but still very good, detection rate of 77% with no false 
alarms.  
























































Figure 8.25: Left Engine LPT Exit Static Pressure Sensor Failure at Zero at 40sec for Flight Path 
1 to 4 to 8 
 
























































Figure 8.26: Left Engine LPT Exit Static Pressure Sensor Failure at Zero at 40sec for Flight Path  
1 to 2 to 6 
Figure 8.27 and Figure 8.28 contain the results of the LPT exit static pressure sensor at 
the minimum value. The first flight test has a detection rate of 90% and zero false alarms, while 
the second has a detection rate of 76% and no false alarms. These results are very similar to the 
zero sensor failure. For the lower rates in Figure 8.26 and Figure 8.28, the poor detection 
corresponds to flight at point 6.  


























































Figure 8.27: Left Engine LPT Exit Static Pressure Sensor Failure at Minimum at 40sec for    
Flight Path 1 to 4 to 8 
 


























































Figure 8.28: Left Engine LPT Exit Static Pressure Sensor Failure at Minimum at 40sec for     
Flight Path 1 to 2 to 6 
8.4.3 Mixer Pressure Ratio Sensor Failure 
The final tested failure is the mixer pressure ratio sensor at a constant maximum value 
found for operational point 1. The simulation of this failure suggested that it would have a 
significant effect on general operation of the engine, mainly because it is connected to so many 
of the other parameters – actuators and sensors. This was expected to allow for high detection 
rates. Figure 8.29 and Figure 8.30 illustrate the detection results. Figure 8.29 shows the flight 
test at points 1, 4, and 8 with a detection rate of 55% and 0 false alarms. The section showing 
























































poor detection is during deceleration to point 8 with a low throttle command. Figure 8.30 has 
no false alarms and a detection rate of 47%, where the poor detection occurs at decreasing or 
low throttle.  
 
Figure 8.29: Left Engine Mixer Pressure Ratio Sensor Failure at 40sec for Flight Path 1 to 4 to 8 
 
























































Figure 8.30: Left Engine Mixer Pressure Ratio Sensor Failure at 40sec for Flight Path 1 to 2 to 6 
The explanation of the lower than expected detection rates for this failure is the fact 
that the mixer pressure ratio is used as a detector. The mixer pressure ratio is influenced by the 
most parameters in the system, which is why it was chosen as a detector. However, when the 
mixer pressure ratio sensor fails and its output is constant at this high value, its effectiveness is 
voided and the system has to rely on the other parameters to detect the failure. This is due to 
the fact that large portions of the normal operation take place in the vicinity of this maximum 
output value as can be seen in Figure 8.5 and Figure 8.6. Additionally, a second identifier, the 
mixer area saturates at a value that is close to the normal operational point. This places the 
regions of this failure very close to the self and exposed to erroneous inclusion into the self. It is 























































expected that complete optimization of the detector set may succeed in better separating 
these regions from the self. Even without the optimization, the detection rates shown are still 
pretty good and detecting the failure immediately after its occurrence, as shown in Figure 8.30, 
is very important.  
8.5 Overall Performance 
To better compare results of the failures tested, all of the detection rates are tabulated 
in Table 8.1. As shown in the table, all of the results, with the exception of the nozzle area, have 
very good detection rates and low false alarms. Even the nozzle area has an acceptable rate 
over the tested flight envelope. The overall average of the false alarms including the validation 
data was 0.246% which is extremely low.  









































0.535% 1.434% 0.246% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 
Some of the failure detection results can now be compared to the results from previous 
research [32]. Table 8.2 shows the detection rates and false alarms for 6 different selves tested 
as well as for the self developed for this thesis. The results for Self#1 through Self#6 are for a 
98% engine failure for flight from 1 to 2 to 3. These selves are based on aircraft dynamic 
measurements, artificial neural network state estimates, tracking errors, and artificial neural 
network compensation produced by the fault tolerant adaptive control laws because no 
internal engine parameters were yet modeled. The results for the new self include engine 
throttle failure and engine burner fuel flow valve failure averaged over their flights for 1 to 2 to 























Self#1 3 516 80.62 19.59 
Self#2 6 504 68.12 0.06 
Self#3 6 507 44.13 0.56 
Self#4 8 504 59.8 2.5 
Self#5 3 507 0.84 0.78 










5 991 99.96 0.25 
 
It is important to mention the differences and subsequent effects of the previous and 
current research results. The number of detectors for the new AIS is approximately double that 
of the former selves; however, an analysis in previous research showed that no significant 
improvement was obtained by increasing the number of detectors in the 6 selves. The detector 
set generated for the new engine model is only partially optimized; meaning further efforts 
using the WVU AIS interactive design environment can improve the failure detection results.  
The best two self sets from the 98% reduced efficiency engine failure were self #1 and 
self #2. Self #1 had a high detection rate but also high false alarms while self #2 had low false 
alarms and an acceptable detection rate. The strength of the engine failures is important when 
comparing the detection results. Since the throttle failure is approximately equal to an 87% 
reduced efficiency engine failure, it is a softer failure than 98% reduced efficiency, i.e. should be 
harder to detect. The throttle failure average detection rate was 83% only slightly higher than 
the 81% of self #1, but the false alarms for the throttle failure were much smaller. Compared to 
self #2, the throttle failure has a much higher detection rate and close false alarms. The engine 
burner fuel flow failure is stronger at about 113% reduced efficiency, but the detection rate is 
much higher at 100% with very good false alarms. By comparing the throttle failure to the 
engine burner fuel flow failure, it is apparent that reducing the strength of the failure does not 
reduce the detection rate drastically. Overall, the self generated from the new engine model 
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shows better detection rates and very good false alarms, and even though the engines models 





Chapter 9: Conclusions 
MAPPS was used to develop a linear engine model that allows for flexibility in modeling 
and detecting a variety of engine malfunctions. Integrated with the WVU F-15 model, a user is 
capable of implementing new advanced engine failures in addition to previously modeled 
engine failures. The failures include 7 engine actuators and 8 engine sensors each with several 
options for the failure scenario.  
Real-time flight data was obtained from the WVU F-15 model and the WVU 6-DOF flight 
simulator where pilots performed typical maneuvers within the defined flight envelope. While 
the linear engine model was valid for these experiments, some effort to create a more advance 
linear model effective over a larger flight envelope and/or with full power capabilities could be 
beneficial. 
The WVU AIS design environment was used to develop a detection scheme which tested 
the experimental flight data for engine failures. The detection scheme developed from internal 
engine parameters demonstrated improvement compared to previous results. Some failures 
produced excellent detection rates and false alarms while still others had very good results. 
Also, the same level of robustness of the data acquisition process has been confirmed for 
propulsion system malfunction as previously determined for other aircraft sub-systems. Results 
could be further improved by complete optimization of detector sets, increase of the amount of 
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This appendix contains several more examples for engine failure responses. Each failure 
has the same standard throttle input with the left failure injected at 5sec. The figures for each 
failure follow. 
Left Engine Power Lever Stuck at 0: 
 

























Left Engine Burner Fuel Flow at 0lbm/hr:  
 



























Left Engine Nozzle Area Locked at 200in2: 
 
 

























Left Engine Mixer Area Locked at 50in2: 
 

























Left Engine Low-Pressure Spool Speed Sensor at Minimum of 5500RPM: 
 

























Left Engine High-Pressure Compressor Exit Pressure Sensor at Maximum of 135psia: 
 

























Left Engine High-Pressure Compressor Exit Pressure Sensor at Minimum of 30psia: 
 

























Left Engine Low-Pressure Turbine Exit Pressure Sensor at Minimum of 13psia: 
 

























Left Engine Mixer Pressure Ratio Sensor at Maximum of 1.09: 
 

























Left Engine Mixer Pressure Ratio Sensor at Minimum of 1.02: 
 




















Figure A.50: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Mixer Pressure Ratio Min. Failure (5) 
